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THE URBAN POLICY CHALLENGE:
INTEGRATING ACROSS SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY
SUSAN S. FAiNSTEIN*
&
ANN MARKUSEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
The uprisings that raged through Los Angeles in April 1992 pro-
pelled the issue of urban policy on to the national agenda after a decade
of neglect. They left in their aftermath calls by community groups and
members of Congress alike for attention to the racial ghettoes of our dis-
tressed inner cities. This violence and outcry bore an uncanny resem-
blance to events in the late 1960s. At that time, civil unrest in Watts and
other American neighborhoods prompted demands for national action,
which led to the Kerner Commission Report.
In this paper, we argue that the Kerner Commission got some things
right and some things wrong. It correctly noted the need for place-based
policies to overcome poverty and disinvestment, a public policy principle
abandoned during the twelve years of the Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions. What it missed was the need to integrate economic, and social pol-
icy, both at the urban and national levels. This blind spot led to the
championing of policies which evolved into separate, piecemeal social
services segregated from new, local economic development policies. To-
gether, these independent social and economic policies had a perverse
result: they failed to halt capital outmigration, deepened urban poverty
in the inner city, and cut into the resources that state and local govern-
ments had at their disposal to reverse these trends. This time around, an
effective urban policy must blend social and economic policy if inner cit-
ies are to be revitalized and their residents provided a life of adequate
employment and hope. We examirie first the "place versus people" de-
bate and then discuss the elements of integrated national policies oriented
toward urban areas.
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II. PLACE-BASED VERSUS PEOPLE-BASED POLICIES
Since the 1960s, economists and policymakers have carried on a des-
ultory intellectual debate over whether policies should be aimed at
places, like inner cities and depressed rural areas, or at people. In a semi-
nal paper published in 1966, Louis Winnick argued against programs
aimed at places and for those aimed at individuals.' He believed both
that aiding places was an inefficient way of reaching worthy individuals,
in that some unworthy (i.e., higher income) residents would receive some
of the benefits, and that assisting some places at the expense of others
imposed penalties on the worthy residents of places not targeted.2 By
and large, this view was adopted by most economists over the next two
decades, even though the necessity for quick action and the nature of
politics in the American federal system, with its territorially-based repre-
sentation, ensured that some place-based policies would nevertheless be
crafted.
The 1968 Kerner Commission Report, without explicitly addressing
the underlying rationales, argued for place-based policies. To combat
unemployment, for instance, it endorsed the consolidation and spatial
concentration of employment services in twenty select inner cities and
two rural high-poverty areas, and it recommended tax credits for the
location and renovation of plants in a limited number of urban and rural
impoverished areas.3 In 1980, however, the President's Commission for
a National Agenda for the Eighties, which was established under Presi-
dent Carter but reported on the eve of the new Reagan Administration,
took a strong position in favor of assistance to individuals. It contended
that place-oriented policies diluted the efficacy of funding directed at
poverty alleviation and that some localities should be allowed to shrink
and their residents encouraged to relocate to more promising locales.4
Dissenting scholars have written in defense of place-based policies,
1. See Louis Winnick, Place Prosperity vs. People Prosperity: Welfare Considerations in
the Geographic Redistribution of Economic Activity, in ESSAYS IN URBAN LAND ECONOMICS
IN HONOR OF THE SIxTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY OF LEO GREBLER 273 (Real Estate Research
Program, University of California at Los Angeles ed., 1966),
2. For a discussion of Winnick's contribution, see Roger Bolton, 'Place Prosperity vs Peo-
ple Prosperity' Revisited: An Old Issue with a New Angle, 29 URB. STUD. 185-203 (1992). See
also Matthew Edel, 'People' versus 'Places' in Urban Impact Analysis, in THE URBAN IMPACTS
OF FEDERAL POLICIES 175-91 (Norman J. Glickman ed., 1980).
3. See REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 233, 236 (Ban-
tam Books 1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMM'N REPORT].
4. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR THE EIGHTIES, URBAN
AMERICA IN THE EIGHTIES (U.S. Government Printing Office 1980). For a review of how
urban policy lost its place-based focus and succumbed to an economic developmentalist ap-
proach, see Ann Markusen & David Wilmoth, The Political Economy of National Urban Policy
in the USA, 1976-1981, 5 CANADIAN J. REGIONAL SCL. 125-44 (1982).
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particularly those aimed at cities. Taking issue with the Commission for
a National Agenda in the Eighties, Gordon Clark championed place and
community as important national values that would be injured by policy-
driven outmigration.5 Ann Markusen argued against a national policy of
neutrality toward the pace of change. She demonstrated that rapid
change, which decimated older, industrial inner cities, created underu-
tilization of urban infrastructure and, at the same time, accelerated sub-
urban and exurban growth, resulting in costly and unnecessary subsidies
for erecting new infrastructure in the latter.6 Roger Bolton recently has
reviewed this literature. He pioneered a new conceptualization of the
value of a "sense of place" and reissued the call for policy directed to-
ward localities.7
Although Clark based his normative argument on equity grounds,
while Bolton and Markusen relied on efficiency criteria, both approaches
agree on two basic phenomena: first, positive externalities not registered
in the marketplace and not reducible to individual experience reside in
places; second, preservation and enhancement of these externalities are in
the national interest for both efficiency and equity reasons. Externalities
are the consequences, positive and negative, of behavior which are exper-
ienced not by the actor but by others in the environment, be they busi-
nesses, governments, or individuals. Espousing theoretical approaches
that offer firms and workers the maximum flexibility in choosing where
to live and do business does not guarantee that total social welfare will be
maximized.
Several types of externalities have been articulated. First, there is
the impact of firm and individual behavior on other individuals-the im-
provement or deterioration in social circumstances (the change in com-
munity, family, psychic satisfaction, or recreational opportunities), in
asset values (chiefly of owner-occupied housing), in job prospects, in the
transfer of information, and in public services. Bolton's work is particu-
larly acute in exploring the "sense of place" as an asset in which people
are willing to invest and from which they gain returns.
Second, a rich literature on urban agglomeration shows the value of
5. See GORDON L. CLARK, INTERREGIONAL MIGRATION, NATIONAL POLICY, AND SO-
CIAL JUSTICE (1983).
6. See Ann Markusen, Federal Budget Simplification: Preventive Programs vs. Palliatives
for Local Governments with Booming, Stable and Declining Economies, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 249
(1977).
7. See Roger Bolton, An Economic Interpretation of a "Sense of Place" (Williams Col-
lege Research Paper No. 130, 1989) [hereinafter Bolton, A "Sense of Place'"; Bolton, supra
note 2, at 185-203.
8. Bolton, A "Sense of Place," supra note 7, at 16.
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place for firms 9-- the entry or exit of other firms in the environment may
affect the cost structures and sales opportunities for existing firms. Cen-
tral places like cities offer important advantages due to economies of
scale resulting from their status as major loci for information, goods, la-
bor, and consumption. Disagglomeration-the deterioration of networks
of firms and labor pools when capital outmigration occurs-is a dynamic
process that can be set off by a rather mild but coincidental withdrawal
of some subsegment of the economic community, causing a cumulative
process 0 that ultimately can be quite destructive to the ensemble of in-
come-generating activities characterizing an area economy.
Finally, rapid changes in neighborhoods affect subnational govern-
ments whose investments in infrastructure and public services presume a
certain size and character of the locality. Both revenue concerns and
scale economies shape the quality and level of public services and new
investments in long-term infrastructure. Rapid rates of growth or unex-
pected rates of decline create negative externalities that make public ser-
vice provision difficult and often inefficient. Underutilized public sector
capacity is wasted, while overutilized capacity diminishes the quality of
services for residents. The allocation of federally funded infrastructure-
highways, sewer, and water projects-also may be inefficient and inequi-
table if it does not take place-based factors into account.
The justification for place-based policies is that benefits such as the
sense of place, agglomeration economies, and public infrastructure are
geographically fixed assets, with returns that are at least in part "public
goods." Social service and employment policies aimed at individuals and
economic development policies targeted at individual firms regardless of
place can contribute to the deterioration of any or all of these place-based
assets. For example, an investment tax credit that encourages firms to
build new plants in suburban or exurban locations rather than maintain-
ing or building them in existing communities has negative consequences
for workers, firms, and city governments left behind." A policy orienta-
9. For original works on agglomeration, see WILBUR R. THOMPSON, A PREFACE TO
URBAN ECONOMICS (1965), JOHN FRIEDMANN, URBANIZATION, PLANNING AND NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (1973), ALLAN PRED, CITY SYSTEMS IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES: PAST
GROWTH, PRESENT PROCESSES, AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS (1977), and HARRY
W. RICHARDSON, REGIONAL ECONOMICS: LOCATION, THEORY, URBAN STRUCTURE, AND
REGIONAL CHANGE (1969).
10. See Nicholas Kaldor, The Role of Increasing Returns, Technical Progress and Cumu-
lative Causation in the Theory of International Trade and Economic Growth, in THE ESSEN-
TIAL KALDOR 43-61 (F. Targetti and A.P. Thirwall eds., 1989).
11. See Michael Luger, Some Micro-Consequences of Macro Policies: The Case of Business
Tax Incentives, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION-TAx INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA (1981).
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tion that pays attention to these fixed assets leads inevitably, then, to
advocacy for place-sensitive programs at the national level. Indeed, dur-
ing the Carter years, it was recommended that all national policies be
evaluated, via "urban impact statements," for their positive or negative
impact on spatially fixed assets. 12
In reality, it is very difficult to measure agglomeration economies,
public sector capacity utilization, and the value of an area's sense of
place. Bolton explores the measurement problems for the latter at
length, acknowledging the difficulties. 3 These externalities are indeed
considerable-the size of our social services and economic development
budgets are one indicator of just how substantial they may be. Place-
based policies are a legitimate, if imprecise, way of preserving existing
externalities, economizing on the provision of public infrastructure, and
eliminating some of the displacement that otherwise reappears as claims
on the social services budget. Providing protection, stability, and con-
tinuity for existing communities and directing resources to those which,
at any one point in time, are at risk can be a powerful way of increasing
both standards of living and the viability of local economies. This has
become a rather novel idea in 1992, after a decade in which we devel-
oped national amnesia about the importance of place and the lessons of
the 1960s. Yet, because racial concentration in inner cities has barely
diminished in the intervening period, the need for policies that take into
account the coincidence of place and poverty has only become more
obvious.
Place-based policies encompass both urban and rural locales. For
historical reasons, concerning both sectoral specialization and different
cultural patterns of settlement, the two have been treated separately, with
policy-making power delegated to different agencies. The problems of
rural areas and their remedies often have been closely tied to agriculture
and natural resource development, and to the special problems of Native-
American (in the West), African-American' 4 (in the cotton-belt South),
and poor white (Appalachian) populations. Urban areas, on the other
hand, experience problems associated with industrial decline,
suburbanization of economic activity, and the mix of populations built
up from poor black migrants from the rural South and immigrants from
12. See THE URBAN IMPACT OF FEDERAL POLICIES, supra note 2, at 3-19, especially Ann
Markusen, Urban Impact Analysis in the U.S.: A Critical Review 103-07, for a review of the
urban impact statement proposal.
13. Bolton, A "Sense of Place," supra note 7, at 32-37.
14. Editor's Note: The contributors to this Symposium have used the terms "African
American," "black," and "black American," often interchangeably, in their articles. The
North Carolina Law Review has elected to defer to its contributors' choices in the absence of
any universally accepted racial or ethnic designation.
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abroad. In this Essay, we confine our analysis to the urban case,
although analogous arguments can be made for rural policies.
III. THE TASK: INTEGRATING ACROSS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
When the Kerner Commission Report was published in 1968, the
United States was at the peak of its post-World War II affluence. The
massive restructuring of employment and space that loomed just beyond
the horizon had not yet come into view.1" The three overall policy
choices set out in the Commission's report--continuation of existing pol-
icies, ghetto enrichment, and racial integration 16-- assumed the existence
of a healthy overall economic framework within which African Ameri-
cans could achieve prosperity if their specific circumstances were altered.
Consequently, it was possible to regard the situation of African Ameri-
cans as an anomaly to be treated by overcoming economic and social
barriers to their advancement. The Commission attributed lack of access
to jobs and low wages to inferior schooling, exclusion from job referral
networks, suburban decentralization of employment, and discrimination
in hiring and promotion. 7 Proposed economic remedies boiled down to
worker training (elimination of the skills mismatch), removal of labor
market frictions (bringing labor and jobs into proximity), and ending ra-
cial discrimination."3
Discussion of the characteristics now captured by the phrase "world
economic restructuring" had not yet entered the policy discourse in
1968.19 The effects of regional shift, internationalization of the United
States economy, growth of the informal sector, downgrading of manufac-
15. See Robert A. Beauregard, Space, Time, and Economic Restructuring, in ECONOMIC
RESTRUCTURING AND POLITICAL RESPONSE 209, 210-15 (Robert A. Beauregard ed., 1989)
(defining economic restructuring and providing an extensive series of references to the litera-
ture on the subject).
16. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 218-19.
17. Id. at 91-93.
18. Id. at 231-36.
19. For a sampling of the now vast literature, see generally DAVID HARVEY, THE UR-
BANIZATION OF CAPITAL: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF CAPITALIST URBAN-
IZATION (1985) (examining capitalism as it relates to the urban process); Beauregard, supra
note 15, at 209-40 (exploring the various conceptions of economic restructuring); Erica
Schoenberger, From Fordism to Flexible Accumulation; Technology, Competitive Strategies,
and International Location, 6 ENV'T & PLAN.: SOC'Y & SPACE 245, 250-54 (1988) (analyzing
the shift from Fordism to flexible production); Allan J. Scott, Flexible Production Systems and
Regional Development: The Rise of New Industrial Spaces in North America and Western Eu-
rope, 12 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 171, 178-82 (1988) (describing the emergence of
flexible specialization in manufacturing systems); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATIONAL
CITY (1991) (describing the role of technology in shaping economic restructuring).
1468 [Vol. 71
THE URBAN CRISIS
turing,2 ° flexible specialization of industry, decline of mass production
industries, the hollowing out of the corporation, and the domination of
central-city economies by financial and business services were just begin-
ning to transform job markets.21 The Commission analyzed the spatial
shift resulting from the movement of rural blacks to northern cities;22 it
lacked the foresight to predict the counter-movement of manufacturing
jobs from the industrial north to low-wage locations in the American
South and West and around the world. Writing at a time when the na-
tional unemployment rate was only 3.8%, the Commission considered
spatial mismatch only in terms of intra-metropolitan, rather than global,
location of industry and workers.23 Similarly, it did not anticipate the
massive increase in immigration of the following two decades that would
heighten the competition for low-skilled jobs. National stagnation in em-
ployment, an increasingly polarized income distribution, and the result-
ing political strains had not yet combined to produce both increased
poverty and greater public reluctance to assist the poor.
The Commission did make passing reference to stimulating indus-
trial and commercial development in poverty areas through tax credits,24
discussed the encouragement of small businesses in ghetto areas,25 and
stresses the importance of skills training and job placement.26 It failed,
however, to explore the relationship between the structure of the national
economy and the position of black workers. Nor did it propose strategies
to affect the structure of industry through sectoral stimulus, development
banking, employee or community ownership, or local development cor-
porations. Furthermore, the dependence of households on female earn-
ings "had not yet been recognized;27 therefore, the significance of the
prevailing low wages in female-dominated occupations for the persistence
20. Saskia Sassen describes the "downgrading of the manufacturing sector" as "a process
in which the share of unionized shops declines and wages deteriorate while sweatshops and
industrial homework proliferate. This process includes the downgrading of jobs within ex-
isting industries and the job supply patterns of some of the new industries .... SASKIA
SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEw YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 9 (1991).
21. See WILLIAM W. GOLDSMITH & EDWARD J. BLAKELY, SEPARATE SOCIETIES: POV-
ERTY AND INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. CITIES passim (1992) (providing an excellent recent dis-
cussion of the relationship between economic restructuring, race, poverty, and policy).
22. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 116-18.
23. Id. at 217.
24. Id. at 235-36.
25. Id. at 236.
26. Id. at 79, 232-33.
27. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., lST SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTI-
TLEMENT PROGRAMS 951 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT
PROGRAMS].
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of poverty was misinterpreted.2"
With the hindsight of the 1990s, it is possible to see the economic
position of African Americans as dependent on three factors: (1) the
improvement in the aggregate performance of the United States econ-
omy; (2) the selection by the federal government of overall national eco-
nomic development strategies intended to have positive impacts on
central-city populations as well as on the aggregate economy-that is,
the choice of general policies for economic stimulus of the whole country
that are also most likely to affect inner cities favorably; and (3) the for-
mulation of programs targeted specifically at central-city economies that
would stabilize the economic base and generate jobs accessible to local
residents-that is, the design of programs that constitute what usually is
labeled an urban policy.
The principal thrust of the Kerner Commission's specific recom-
mendations addressed social rather than economic policy. The Commis-
sion did concern itself with the fragmentation of programs that affected
low-income African-American communities, commenting that: "[T]he
typical ghetto resident has interrelated social and economic problems
which require the services of several government and private agencies.
At the same time, he may be unable to identify his problems to fit the
complicated structure of government."29 Nevertheless, the Commission
framed its concerns almost entirely in terms of social service provision
rather than national economic programs or coordinating services to indi-
viduals with place-oriented economic development efforts.
Ironically, the preoccupation with social policy that characterized
the Kerner Report subsequently was almost wholly reversed at both the
national3" and local levels of government. The federal government cut
back on social programs, especially those grants-in-aid designed to assist
localities in improving services.31 City governments, forced to cope with
28. See infra pp. 1472-73, 1438 & notes 40, 66, 67.
29. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 285.
30. The first national urban policy report prepared by the Reagan Administration de-
clared: "The basis of the Reagan Administration's Urban Policy is to place the highest prior-
ity on economic growth as the most important element of such policy." U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.
& URBAN DEv., THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REPORT 11 (1982).
31. Federal aid decreased from 23% to 15% of municipal own-source revenue between
1980 and 1984, and state aid (in turn dependent on federal transfers) declined similarly. Put
another way, for every dollar the average city itself raised in 1980, it was able to spend $1.56,
while for every dollar it raised in 1984 it could spend only $1.44. Curtailments of assistance
for employment and training programs were especially severe; federal outlays under the Jobs
Partnership Training Act were cut 69% in constant (1986) dollars between 1980 and 1986.
See Susan S. Fainstein & Norman Fainstein, The Ambivalent State: Economic Development
Policy in the U.S. Federal System under the Reagan Administration, 25 URB. AFF. Q. 47, 47-52
(1989).
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this decline in federal assistance at the same time as they were experienc-
ing population transformation and employment loss, moved strongly into
the economic development arena, but with limited funds and few power-
ful planning tools. Without other sources of substantial financing at their
disposal for supporting development, they entered into Faustian bargains
with the private sector, in which they traded away capital expenditures,
land, and future revenues in order to attract development. The combina-
tion of impoverished populations and a constrained tax base then de-
prived them of the resources necessary for adequate social service
programs.
The lion's share of local governmental effort and resources has been
directed at property-led economic development based in downtown office
projects.32 Even so, municipalities have engaged in numerous experi-
ments in community economic development.33 These efforts, however,
mainly have lacked federal backing and have not been integrated into
either national economic policy or local social policy. The many local
economic development corporations have only very limited sources of
financing, and much of the time and energy of their staffs is devoted to
raising funds rather than operating programs. The extent to which they
attempt to serve broad social purposes, like providing needed neighbor-
hood services or assisting the hard-core unemployed, varies considerably
and depends on the orientations of the staffs. Although such groups de-
serve praise for their efforts to provide an indigenous economic base in
inner-city neighborhoods, their total impact is quite small.34
A. Federal Policies
Currently, the problems of the national economy mean that, for
political as well as economic reasons, the labor market disadvantages of
the African-American population can be addressed only within the con-
text of an overall urban economic policy that addresses issues of both
place and poverty. This insight is fundamental to William Julius Wil-
son's argument in his two major books,35 in which he attributes black
32. See Marc V. Levine, The Politics of Partnership: Urban Redevelopment Since 1945, in
UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIPS 12, 12-13 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1989).
33. See PETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: STATE AND
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES passim (1988).
34. See generally Michael B. Teitz, Neighborhood Economics: Local Communities and
Regional Markets, 3 ECON. DEV. Q. 111, 111-22 (1989). Professor Teitz argues that economic
development policies at the local, neighborhood level "face great difficulties in raising incomes
or bringing people into the economic mainstream" due to the "historic divorce of workplace
from residence." Id. at 112.
35. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UN-
DERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) [hereinafter WILSON, TRULY DISADVANTAGED];
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poverty to economic restructuring and to resulting changes in the labor
market causing well-paying unskilled jobs to disappear.36 He contends
further that it is feasible politically to combat the predicament of the
underclass only through universal policies aimed at redressing the ine-
qualities generated by the economy.
37
Wilson's discussion raises the long-debated issue of the relative con-
tributions of race and class to the disadvantaged position of minorities.
His research incorporates not only the purely analytical question of the
power of each variable in predicting lifetime earnings or educational
achievement, 38 but also the political question of what emphasis likely
produces the best policy response. Even if racial discrimination is the
most important determinant of the status of African Americans, he be-
lieves that strong explicit policies aimed at redressing discrimination
through affirmative action, hiring quotas, and forced residential integra-
tion provoke too much conflict to remain politically viable.
Such remedies are extremely divisive because they address the race
problem without attempting to resolve class issues. If they worked, such
policies simply would shift African Americans into slots now held by
other members of the working class. In the 1990s, the poor populations
of the inner cities are more complex than they were in the 1960s, with
substantial groups of Hispanics, Asians, and whites displaced from older
industrial sectors competing for a shrinking number of jobs. African
Americans still suffer the greatest discrimination and segregation, but
unless affirmative action efforts are accompanied by economic policies
that increase the aggregate number of jobs and raise wages at the lowest
levels of the economy, they merely will alter the composition of the poor
without diminishing their numbers.
Critics of Wilson justifiably have accused him of discounting racial
factors in his analysis of the circumstances of black communities, of ex-
aggerating the extent to which blacks ever lived in class-integrated com-
munities, of overstating the geographic mobility of middle-class blacks,39
WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978) [hereinafter WILSON,
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE].
36. WILSON, TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 35, at 39-46; WILSON, DECLINING
SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 35, at 88-121.
37. WILSON, TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 35, at 140-64; WILSON, DECLINING
SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 35, at 144-54.
38. For an extensive investigation of this question, see ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS
93-160 (1992).
39. See REYNOLDS FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE GAP? passim
(1984) (using a demographic analysis of social and economic trends to discredit some of Wil-
son's findings); Norman Fainstein, Race, Class, and Segregation: Discourses about African
Americans, 17 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. (forthcoming 1993) (analyzing how the way in
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and of disregarding the plight of low-wage female black workers." Such
criticisms, however, do not contravene Wilson's thesis that general eco-
nomic trends severely injure black workers who lack the educational
qualifications, social connections, and spatial mobility to compete for the
limited number of well-paying jobs in the modem economy. Economic
policies that would unite the white, brown, and black working classes
would command more political support than explicitly race-oriented pro-
grams. In addition, the surcease of attacks on the public sector, the res-
toration of federal revenue sharing with local governments, and a
reversal of the thrust toward privatization would enormously enhance
the economic prospects of African Americans who are employed dispro-
portionately by governmental agencies.
Effective policies for black, low-income, inner-city areas require fed-
eral programs with broad scope; they must foster economic enterprise,
raise wage levels, train the workforce, place workers in jobs, and provide
services such as health maintenance and day care that enable workers to
keep their jobs. Such an ambitious mandate requires both instruments
specifically designed to stimulate inner-city job growth and general pro-
grams of infrastructure investment, defense conversion, labor legislation,
educational assistance, industrial and trade policies, and taxation that, at
a minimum, do not harm central cities and that, when possible, dispro-
portionately benefit them.41
which the debate is framed obscures issues); Norman Fainstein, The Underclass/Mismatch
Hypothesis as an Explanation for Black Economic Deprivation, 15 POL. & Soc'y 403, 413-18,
421-29, 447-48 (1987) (disputing that economic and educational factors alone cause the depri-
vation of African Americans).
40. Adolph Reed, Jr., The Liberal Technocrat, 246 THE NATION 167, 168 (1988) (review-
ing WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987)). Like Wilson, the Kerner
Commission saw the solution to the economic problems of black women as improving the
employment situation of black men. After pressing for an "upgrading" of employment for
black men, the Report noted that "[t]he fact that almost half of all adult Negro women work
reflects the fact that so many Negro males have unsteady and low-paying jobs." KERNER
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 125-26. The Report nowhere suggested an upgrading of
female employment.
41. Theda Skocpol notes that United States policy consistently has lacked coordination.
between its economic and social components:
Back during the founding period of its modern interventionist state, from 1930
through 1946, the United States originally opted not to closely coordinate "social"
and "economic" interventions .... The technical and intellectual capacities of the
federal government to devise and implement targeted industrial or labor market in-
terventions were not improved during the era of commercial Keynesian dominance.
Little intellectual or political legitimacy was built up for the notion that the federal
government could--or should-pursue economic, employment, and social-welfare
objectives through the same public policies or through deliberately coordinated pub-
lic policies.
Theda Skoepol, The Limits of the New Deal System and the Roots of Contemporary Welfare
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During the 1970s a number of analysts pointed to urban policy as
the unintended consequence of general legislation aimed at influencing
the economy or building transportation infrastructure.42 Cities largely
suffered from these policies; for example, the interstate highway program
contributed strongly to middle-class flight from central cities, even
though suburban development was not a goal of the program. During
the Reagan-Bush years, a variety of policies ostensibly intended to stimu-
late the economy, reduce inflation, cut the size of government, and free
up the private sector had extremely negative effects on central cities. Tax
reductions, the favored policy for encouraging investment, reduced the
funds available for supporting social programs. Cuts in social-service ex-
penditures not only weakened programs but caused the physical with-
drawal of agencies whose presence in low-income areas had provided
them with a stable institutional framework. High interest rates com-
bined with the strong dollar to decimate American manufacturing, par-
ticularly in the auto and steel industries, where well-paid minority
workers were among the first fired. Privatization of governmental serv-
ices destroyed public sector jobs that had offered career ladders for Afri-
can Americans. Finally, the wave of mergers and acquisitions that
thrived on deregulation exacerbated the plant closings and office consoli-
dations that further shrunk the economic bases of central cities.
B. A National Urban Policy
In addition to designing broad policies that channel benefits to low-
income people, the federal government needs once again to endeavor to
create an urban policy. As we argued at the beginning of this Essay,
spatially oriented programs are a necessary part of any effort to over-
come urban poverty. Under the Reagan and Bush Administrations, en-
terprise zones (EZs), while never actually enacted at the federal level,
became the favored urban program. Within such zones, businesses
would receive regulatory and tax relief. They continue to be touted as an
effective remedy for the absence of business development in low-income
neighborhoods, and President Bill Clinton called for their establishment
in his first economic address to Congress.43 By 1990, EZs existed in
Dilemmas, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 293, 301-02 (Mar-
garet Weir et al. eds., 1988).
42. See THE URBAN IMPACTS OF FEDERAL POLICIES, supra note 2 (containing a collec-
tion of articles by authors discussing the impacts of federal policies on urban areas).
43. Text of the President's Address to a Joint Session of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1993, at A14 [hereinafter Presidential Address].
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thirty-seven states, where they have received mixed reviews.44 Despite
their popularity, EZs are severely deficient in their capacity to rectify the
income problems of the working poor, since their essence is to trade on
the advantages of a low-wage workforce. Thus, in terms of the dual
problems afflicting the African-American community, unemployment
and poverty-level wages, even the most efficacious EZs address only the
first and may have a deleterious effect on the second.45 Moreover, unless
federal legislation incorporated provisions mandating social services for
potential workers and technical support for local businesses, EZ benefits
would go mainly to corporations placing branch operations within the
zones rather than low-income residents.46
The only other urban initiative of the Bush Administration was the
HOPE program,47 which sells public housing to tenants. Minimally
funded, this program does nothing to increase the stock of low-income
housing and siphons money away from construction programs. Despite
the passage of the 1990 Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act,48 federally funded housing construction in 1991 comprised only
82,000 units as compared with 248,000 in 1977. 49 The Bush Administra-
tion did continue job-training programs under the Job Training Partner-
ship Act,5" spending about four billion dollars a year on local efforts that
offered no guarantee of a job to graduates.51
Not only did the Reagan and Bush Administrations sharply cut
funding for existing place-oriented programs, including the community
development and social service block grants as well as the Economic De-
velopment Administration (EDA), they also showed little interest in im-
proving the quality of program administration. For any place-based
program to be successful, it must overcome the artificial boundaries im-
44. See ENTERPRISE ZONES: NEw DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT passim
(Roy E. Green ed., 1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE ZONES].
45. George C. Galster, A Cumulative Causation Model of the Underclass: Implications for
Urban Economic Development Policy, in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK & WHITE 190, 204-05
(George C. Galster & Edward W. Hill eds., 1992).
46. See Enid Beaumont, Enterprise Zones and Federalism, in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra
note 44, at 41, 41-57.
47. Home Ownership Through HOPE Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, tit. IV, 104 Stat. 4148
(1990) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A § 1709; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437, 12870 to 12880, 12891 to 12898
(West Supp. 1990)).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12701-12898
(Supp. 11 1990)).
49. Robert Guskind, The Republican: Checkmated or Just Chary?, PLANNING, Oct. 1992,
at 9, 13.
50. Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1324 (1982); Pub. L. No. 98-524, 98 Stat. 2487 (1984)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1781 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
51. Guskind, supra note 49, at 13-14.
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posed by the functional divisions among bureaucracies. The Kerner
Commission noted accurately:
The system through which Federal programs are translated
into services to people is a major problem in itself ... Federal
programs often seem to be self-defeating and contradictory:
field officials unable to make decisions on their own programs
and unaware of related efforts; agencies unable or unwilling to
work together; programs conceived and administered to
achieve different and sometimes conflicting purposes.52
The Commission noted that a number of attempts at coordination
had been made during the 1960s and that the (now-defunct) Office of
Economic Opportunity and the Model Cities program had been intended
to bring together multiple agencies with the aim of reducing poverty. 3
The Commission recommended the formation of interagency task forces
to achieve coordination at both the federal and municipal levels; it fur-
ther suggested the establishment of multi-service centers and little city
halls within urban neighborhoods.5 4 The Nixon Administration, which
took office immediately following the publication of the Kerner Report,
took little heed of its recommendations. Its principal policy innovation
was the introduction of block grants, which had not figured into the
Commission's discussion, but which did partly overcome interagency
conflicts at the federal level by removing many federal agencies alto-
gether from poverty-related activities. The separation of social service
from Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), however, sus-
tained the fissure between social and economic policy, while the with-
drawal of the federal government from its former interventionist role
under the categorical grant system5" did nothing to force coordination at
the city level.56 Only in the area of "welfare reform" has there been a
serious recent attempt to coordinate economic and social policy. The
52. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 230.
53. Id. at 152.
54. Id. at 150-55.
55. Categorical grants are directed to highly specific programs, usually on a discretionary
basis (for example, water and sewer grants). Block grants are distributed on a formula basis to
all eligible areas for broad purposes. See CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMU-
NITY DEVELOPMENT; CASES AND MATERIALS 102-05 (1989).
56. A portion of the CDBG may be used for social services at the choice of the recipient.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9904(c)(1)(A) (1988). Many municipalities, however, do not exercise this op-
tion. A Department of Housing and Urban Developemnt (HUD) official once commented to
one of the authors that it was inappropriate that CDBG contain a social service component
since HUD did not have the capability to monitor social programs. The concept of incorporat-
ing a social service component into a grant aimed primarily at physical redevelopment dated
from the Model Cities program, which had been framed with the idea that residents affected by
revitalization programs required supportive services. From the HUD official's point of view,
however, the goal of coordinating development and social policy that had inspired the multi-
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various plans adopted by the states in response to federal legislation au-
thorizing experimentation in welfare programs have sought to move peo-
ple from the welfare rolls into either training or jobs. These efforts
usually have involved extensive social services and the identification of
work opportunities. As economic programs, however, they have been
restricted to job placement and have not been concerned with job
creation.7
IV. How To Do IT RIGHT
As the preceding discussion illustrates, broad policies to invigorate
the economy usually have emphasized economic growth with little re-
gard for the social impact. At the same time, programs specifically
designed to assist cities have been curtailed sharply. This section
presents some examples of how economic and social concerns can be in-
tegrated within public policy; we also provide an illustration of how the
federal government can support a local program aimed at stabilizing a
city's economic base. We present first the case of defense conversion and
then, more briefly, the examples of the construction of high-speed rail,
the regulation of women's wages, and federal support of a local effort to
sustain a vital industry.
A. The Case of Defense Conversion
In the 1990s, defense spending is targeted to be cut by thirty to fifty
percent, reversing the enormous build-up of the 1980s and dramatically
scaling back the facilities set in place over forty years of Cold War.58
While welcome for its ability to release resources for more productive
uses in the economy, this transition is apt to worsen the circumstances of
many minorities in selected communities, because defense spending is
highly concentrated across the country. 9 The ironic consequence may
purpose intent of the grant did not outweigh bureaucratic logic. Conversation with HUD
official (Jan. 1980).
57. Some local economic development programs that combine job creation with training
and placement offer an example of the kinds of coordination that could be achieved. For
example, the East Williamsburg Valley Industrial Development Corporation in Brooklyn,
New York, offers technical assistance, marketing support, security, and sanitation services to
manufacturers located in an old industrial area. It also refers job applicants, giving preference
to ex-offenders and welfare recipients, to publicly supported training programs and offers a job
placement program. It is currently seeking to develop a day care center for workers within the
industrial area.
58. See ANN MARKUSEN & JOEL YUDKEN, DISMANTLING THE COLD WAR ECONOMY 1-
8 (1992); ANN MARKUSEN & CATHERINE HILL, CONVERTING THE COLD WAR ECONOMY 7-
9 (1992).
59. See ANN MARKUSEN ET AL., THE RISE OF THE GUNBELT 8-25 (1991).
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be diversion of resources from inner cities, even though they have been
the widely discussed targets for reinvestment of the peace dividend.
First, the cuts will fall disproportionately on staffing of the armed
services rather than on procurement of equipment. Especially at the
lower and less skilled levels, young urban blacks are overrepresented in
the military," making them more vulnerable to cuts. For this group, a
job in the volunteer army has offered a way out of urban poverty and a
means for enhancing education and skills. The involuntary separation of
soldiers and the evaporation of new positions for younger urban youth
will worsen the current unemployment situation in inner cities and
among blacks. Although Congress has passed a generous package of sev-
erance pay and job and educational transition assistance, there is no
mechanism linking these programs to new job creation. Second, a dis-
proportionately high share of military facilities selected for closure are in
urban areas, where they formed a major source of employment for inner-
city residents. Examples include the Philadelphia Naval Shipyards and
the Alameda (Oakland, California) Naval Air Station.61 Civilian person-
nel at these facilities have few other attractive work options.
Third, a projected shift toward high-tech weaponry and away from
older production lines in tanks, ordnance, fighter aircraft, and ships will
concentrate associated unemployment in mature, working class cities like
Groton, Connecticut; St. Louis, Missouri; and Long Beach, California.
These are areas that recruited and absorbed black rural migrants as de-
fense workers during the rapid expansion of weapons production during
World War II, and have since provided high-paying jobs for relatively
skilled, blue-collar workers. The closure of these plants and shipyards
will deepen the unemployment in these centers, compounding poverty
and economic decline. In contrast, design and manufacture of high-tech
weaponry is concentrated heavily in suburban areas around Los Angeles,
Boston, and Silicon Valley, and in newly emerging agglomerations like
Orlando, Colorado Springs, and Huntsville, Alabama.62
Since 1989, when defense outlays first began to fall, a number of
programs have been launched to facilitate adjustment. For the most
part, these have been piecemeal and ill-coordinated; twenty-six separate
categorical programs, spread over three agencies, were packaged in the
60. Paul Magnusson & Seth Payne, Who is Really Doing America's Fighting, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 25, 1991, at 35.
61. Catherine Hill, Base Closures in the 1990's: Lessons for Development, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC CONVERSION & DISARMAMENT, (Working Paper, Washington,
D.C., March 1993).
62. MARKUSEN et al., supra note 59, at 26-50.
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1992 congressional appropriations, at a cost of 1.5 billion dollars. 3 They
treat firms, workers, and communities as separate, atomized candidates
for services. Workers are individualized, offered income support and
training, for instance, only after the plants have closed. Community eco-
nomic diversification planning grants are available from the Department
of Defense (DOD) or the Economic Development Administration
(EDA) in the Department of Commerce, where they are not tied to im-
plementation funds, firm alternative use planning, or worker adjustment
programs. As a result, little progress has been made in efficiently moving
workers out of defense production into civilian activity.
The appropriate way to address the conversion problem would be to
acknowledge its place specificity and to design programs that integrate
firm assistance, worker assistance, and community economic develop-
ment funds in a coherent way. For instance, economic development
planners for a defense-dependent locale could be charged with producing
a vision of the future of the area economy, complete with sectoral special-
izations which would build on the existing skills and expertise of the de-
fense-dependent sectors in the area. This would be far better than
recommending one more world trade center or biotechnology incubator,
as the conversion planning effort in St. Louis did recently. Ways to en-
sure market creation, through federal and state government procure-
ment, standards, and regulations, would be investigated, and each firm,
with worker involvement, could be required to fashion alternative use
plans which would be sensitive to the vision of the future area economy.
Rather than becoming individualized recipients of unemployment
insurance and retraining efforts, workers could be placed into alternative
use planning and served at transition centers set up for counseling, entre-
preneurship training, education and retraining programs, and even ef-
forts at worker/management plant buyouts. By providing place-based
rather than people-based assistance, these programs would preserve the
communities' synergistic assets: a work force with a long history of ca-
maraderie and cooperation and the existing ensemble of physical and
human capital. By keeping resources assembled, coordinated efforts can
salvage much more than compensating programs, which reduce former
military bases and plants to real estate and displaced workers. Pursuing
place-based policies would avoid the worst of the cumulative disinvest-
ment process that might otherwise be set off by defense cuts.
63. Les Aspin, Defense Conversion, Reinvestment and Transition Assistance Act of 1992
($1.512 billion), Memo to the National Conference of Mayors, Oct. 12, 1992, U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services.
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B. National Programs with Spin-offs
The following two examples show how universal national programs
could benefit the inner-city significantly:
(1) The development of high-speed rail, justified as an investment
that will produce national economic growth, has been a priority item on
the Clinton agenda.' In addition to its other spin-offs, it could affect the
spatial distribution of commerce by bringing travelers directly into the
center of cities. Unlike air travel, which carries passengers to peripheral
points and stimulates nodes around the airport, high-speed rail could fos-
ter growth around centrally located train stations. Choices in the design
of such systems, however, would determine whether or not benefits are
actually targeted to central locations. If, in an effort to minimize initial
expenses, rights-of-way were constructed to skirt cities rather than pass
through them, the potential advantages would be lost. Even the con-
struction of suburban stops in addition to central terminals would dimin-
ish positive externalities for core areas, as would the decentralization of
depots for sorting of fast freight.
(2) Comparable-worth legislation, which would require equal pay
for equivalent-though not identical-work, would benefit all women;
however, it particularly would enhance the living standards of African-
American families and add to the consumption fund within central cities.
The wage discrepancy between white and black women is small com-
pared to that between white and black men, but black women are far
more likely than whites to be the sole source of support for their families.
Although Wilson 65 and others have heavily emphasized unemployment
among black men as the principal affliction of ghetto communities, the
low income of African-American women is the direct source of most
poverty among ghetto children, because the majority of them live in
households headed by single women.16 Restructuring of central-city
economies has increased the employment prospects for these women,
who work disproportionately within the clerical, health-service, and do-
mestic-service sectors that have expanded in the last fifteen years. Im-
provement in the relative compensation for these jobs would lift many
African-American families out of poverty.
64. Presidential Address, supra note 43, at A14.
65. WILSON, TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 35, at 46-62.
66. In 1990, 56.2% of black children lived in single-parent households maintained by
their mother. See OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 27, at 951.
67. Of female-headed families with children in which the mother worked at least part of
the time, 28% were classified as poor in 1989, id. at 1145, and 12.7% were considered poor even
when the parent worked full-time, id. at 1144. Because blacks are represented disproportion-
ately among the poor, the figures for black families would likely be higher.
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A general increase in the minimum wage would probably be politi-
cally more acceptable than comparable-worth legislation. Although less
effective in diminishing black poverty, it would, to the extent that women
disproportionately hold minimum wage jobs, also serve to raise relative
female wages. Although both comparable-worth legislation and an in-
crease in the minimum wage are opposed by those who contend that they
would increase unemployment, many of the service jobs in which African
Americans work cannot be exported, and the effect of a uniformly im-
posed wage would prevent domestic competitive price-cutting by creating
a level playing field. The result then would more likely be inflation than
unemployment, 68 as the pay increases are passed on to consumers.
C. Federal Support of a Local Effort
In 1992 Macy's Department Store, already in Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, declared a loss of $1.25 billion. 69 Macy's is a national chain with
its corporate headquarters and largest store in Manhattan. Although
Macy's had stronger revenues per square foot of selling space than al-
most all competing department-store chains, a mid-1980s leveraged buy-
out, in which its management took the store chain private, created a cost
structure unsustainable during an economic downturn.70 The impact of
a total collapse of Macy's would fall heavily on New 'York's minority
population, because Macy's employs many minority workers. Perhaps
even more significantly, the store's purchases constitute a mainstay of the
fragile New York garment industry, which is the city's largest manufac-
turing sector and a very important source of minority (especially His-
panic and Asian) employment.7" It would also be a devastating loss to
the segment of New York's financial industry that specializes in provid-
ing credit to retailers for purchase of stock.
The City of New York, in its various economic development pro-
grams, has offered huge tax subsidies for office construction and business
retention;72 it also has provided capital grants and technical assistance to
small businesses and manufacturers, and has provided large sums to keep
68. Rebecca M. Blank & Alan S. Blinder, Macroeconomics, Income Distribution, and Pov-
erty, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 180, 180-208 (Sheldon H.
Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986) (analyzing the effects of unemployment and infla-
tion on the poor and concluding that unemployment has a far more negative impact).
69. Stephanie Strom, Macy's Pins Hope for Rebound on 5-Year Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1992, at Dl.
70. Id.
71. Roger Waldinger, Race and Ethnicity, in SETTING MUNICIPAL PRIORITIES, 1990, at
50, 65 (Charles Brecher & Raymond D. Horton eds., 1989).
72. See SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN, THE CrrY BUILDERS (forthcoming 1993) (concerning the
use of incentives to real estate development and their impact in New York City).
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the New York Yankees from departing. It has, however, never tried to
rescue a bankrupt department store, even though a number of New
York's most famous retailers have gone out of business. Many would
argue that governmental intervention of this sort constitutes "lemon so-
cialism,""3 that bankruptcy disciplines businesses, and that the market
will give rise to other suppliers that will fulfill Macy's function for New
York's consumers. But the replacement of Macy's by branches of de-
partment stores with headquarters elsewhere-as is happening with the
takeover of sites left vacant by Alexander's, a recently failed chain-
would not produce the backward and forward linkages currently pro-
vided by Macy's. Rather than underwriting the construction costs of
empty office buildings, New York City could affect its economy far more
substantially by sustaining Macy's. To do so, however, it could not sim-
ply supply an off-budget tax break. Rather, it would have to provide
capital up-front, an expensive and politically risky undertaking. Only
with the assistance of a federal development bank would such a venture
be possible; the quid pro quo, however, would have to be a large equity
share in the enterprise for the public. Such public participation in owner-
ship of the corporation could assure that Macy's would maintain the full
operation of its flagship store, that it would support New York businesses
in its purchasing arrangements, and that it would hire New York resi-
dents and develop career ladders for the city's minority population.
V. THE RESTRUCTURING OF URBAN POLICY: THE RIGHT THINGS
AT THE RIGHT LEVEL
We recommend, therefore, a thorough revamping of urban policy
that scales the barrier between economic and social policy while preserv-
ing a place-based orientation. Such a strategy offers the best route to-
ward protection, stability, and continuity while encouraging economic
revitalization. Contrary to the trade-off often assumed between the old
and the new, preservation of existing assets and reticence in using public
money to create new ones may not constitute a drag on economic devel-
opment but rather a wise use of resources. This remains a hypothetical
claim, because it is impossible to total up the sum of externalities and
public costs that account for the difference between purely private cost
and overall social cost. But, at present, the continued deterioration of
our cities and the worsening of rural poverty argue for steps toward pol-
icy integration and place-based policies.
Our recommendations present a major challenge, because simply re-
73. See Staughton Lynd, Towards A Not-for-Profit Economy: Public Development Author-
itiesforAcquisition and Use of Industrial Property, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 13, 40 (1987).
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invigorating place-based agencies like the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) will not suffice. Many of the actions that
affect the economic and social vigor of inner cities currently are lodged in
agencies like the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, mad various eco-
nomic policy-making groups like the Council of Economic Advisors and
President Clinton's new National Economic Council. Most of these have
been relatively conservative and have focused on giveaways to businesses,
but some refreshing new experiments have been undertaken in worker
retraining, small business assistance (Michigan's Modernization Service),
plant closing response (Massachusetts' Industrial Service Program), in-
stitution-building (Pittsburgh's Steel Valley Authority), and sectorally-
oriented task forces (aerospace in Los Angeles, steel in Chicago,
polymers in Akron). A new national initiative would build on these ex-
periments and replicate them elsewhere, rather than erecting unnecessary
new layers of Washington bureaucracy.
A. What To Do in Washington
In Washington, several things could be done to make urban policy
more powerful and streamlined. First, an Office of Urban Policy could
be set up in the White House to oversee the packaging of urban programs
in a way which would force coherence and amplify the effect of federal
dollars. The Director of the Office would sit on the President's National
Economic Council, informing economic policymakers about the impacts
of their proposed plans on cities and adding targeting criteria onto new
initiatives like the investment tax credit. The Office should have the Sec-
retaries of Labor, Commerce, Energy, HHS, HUD, and Defense on its
advisory board, and it should have discretion over pools of resources
from each agency, which it could then package for "one stop shopping"
by localities. Where state and local governments lacked the institutional
capacity to conduct cohesive economic development programs for inner
cities, the Office could help them build it. The Office would have an
ongoing monitoring function, collating relevant data and assessing differ-
ential urban performance.
A prototype for this kind of high-level coordination was created
during the Bush Administration in the Federal Coordinating Council on
Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET) structure for the coor-
dination of science and technology policy. Chaired by the President's
science advisor, the relevant secretaries (Defense, Energy, Transporta-
tion, Commerce, etc.) with significant technology programs began work-
ing together in this setting to rationalize federal technology policy. A
similar Office of Economic Conversion, designed to be self-liquidating at
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the end of the decade, has been proposed to oversee the process of con-
verting from a military to a civilian economy. 4 If established, these of-
fices could ensure that conversion and urban policy might enhance rather
than cancel out each other.
In designing new configurations for federal urban and industrial pol-
icies, the principle of federal funding with state and local implementation
should be followed as closely as possible. In the conversion area, for
instance, the Director of the Massachusetts Industrial Services Program
reported having to write seven grant applications to five different agen-
cies in 1992 for conversion assistance.75 She would strongly prefer "one
stop shopping"-an office to which she could apply for a package which
covers worker retraining, community economic development, and firm
assistance all in one bundle, with considerable flexibility in deploying it.
New federal bureaucracies for administering programs should not be de-
veloped unless circumstances are exceptional. Each place to be targeted
has its own unique circumstances which are best read and addressed at
the local level.
B. What To Do at City Hall
By forcing states and cities to rely on their own resources, twelve
years of Republican administrations succeeded in making lower levels of
government far more capable of intervening in the local economic devel-
opment process than they were previously. Officials have learned how to
market their territories, how to negotiate with the private sector, and
how to plan strategically rather than simply to generate master plans
containing static conceptions of ideal land uses. Except in a few "pro-
gressive" cities,76 however, government officials largely acceded to pri-
vate interests and failed to retain a significant public benefit from the
deals they made with businesses. In part this outcome was the conse-
quence of their lack of significant bargaining resources.
Given the expertise that exists at the state and local level, the prece-
dent of allowing subnational governments to carry out federally funded
urban economic development and social programs ought to continue.
The Kerner Commission's recommendation of a federal inter-agency
task force to monitor programs and insure that they remain within broad
74. See MARKUSEN & HILL, supra note 58, at 56-59.
75. Conversation with Ann Markusen, Professor and Director, Project on Regional and
Industrial Economics, Rutgers University, in New Brunswick, N.J. (Oct. 10, 1992).
76. In his book The Progressive City, Pierre Clavel examines Hartford, Cleveland, Berke-
ley, Santa Monica, and Burlington, Vermont. PIERRE CLAVEL, THE PROGRESSIVE CITY pas-
sim (1986). Chicago during the Administration of Mayor Harold Washington and Boston
under the Raymond Flynn Administration also often are named as progressive cities.
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federal guidelines indicates the appropriate degree of federal involve-
ment. Backed by the federal government, local officials can extract better
bargains from private businesses. Especially in hard economic times,
business resistance to governmental intervention weakens. Just as firms
that previously refused to bid on governmental contracts are now doing
so, many would be willing to accept governmental participation in their
decisionmaking in return for financial stability. Whether through an eq-
uity interest in private firms, contractual agreements, or the establish-
ment of semi-autonomous development corporations, an enriched local
public sector can play an important role in assuring that local economic
actors serve the needs of the local public.
State and local governments also will have to tackle the problem of
marrying social and economic policy. Several states have experimented
with novel ways of doing this. In Washington, for instance, the state
employment agency has permitted workers to take their unemployment
compensation as a lump sum and invest it in a new business, thereby
linking a social program (unemployment services) with job creation (eco-
nomic development). Worker retraining programs in a number of cities
and states have been linked to job commitments by firms and to first-
source hiring programs by government and business. Nevertheless, most
state and city governments continue to run education, training, and so-
cial services programs separately from their economic development ef-
forts. Bridging councils or offices like those we recommend for the
federal government could play a comparable role at the subnational level.
In designing this federal system, some thought must be given to the
possibility that patronage and corruption could destroy the effectiveness
and legitimacy of new urban programs. Pass-throughs to the state and
local level are good only if at those levels competent professionals man-
age the programs, and broad participation ensures that they are well-
crafted. Design principles that ensure such participation will help, as
they did in the Model Cities program. Some federal monitoring of the
use of funds would have to be done, and program evaluation should be
well-funded at the national level to enable improvements in urban pro-
grams to be undertaken readily as we learn from new experiments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kerner Commission Report offers a number of important in-
sights which could be recycled usefully in the 1990s in the aftermath of
the Los Angeles riots. On the one hand, it argues for specific targeting of
inner cities for revitalization. Its depiction of the human potential and
existing built environment of cities makes a powerful case for place-based
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policies to preserve and restore the vitality of existing urban assets. The
neglect of urban policy in the decades following the report, and the wors-
ening of inner-city poverty and deterioration since its publication, sug-
gest that its place-based prescription was right.
Many of the Kerner Commission's concrete suggestions were imple-
mented. But they tended to take the form of uncoordinated attacks on
poverty (through welfare and income maintenance), on unemployment
(through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)),
and on urban development (through block grants). Eventually many of
these programs were reduced or eliminated, but even those that survived
suffered from their isolation from a large, more powerful set of policies,
mostly nonspatial in nature, that were simultaneously undermining the
viability of the very communities that were targeted for aid. The failure
to identify these larger forces made urban programs appear ineffectual
and, even worse, money drains that made easy targets for budget cutters.
In the early 1990s, through a combination of protest and electoral
change, urban problems are again in the spotlight. An effective approach
will have to blend place-based policies with general economic stimuli,
social policy with economic policy, and state and local with federal ap-
proaches. If this can be accomplished, we may be able in another twenty
years to consign the Kerner Commission Report to the historical archives,
honoring it as a seminal document in the restoration of our great Ameri-
can inner cities.
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